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1. Cultural Optics and the History of the
Representation of Vision
More than fifteen years ago, in a paper delivered to the colloquium on 
film history at Cerisy, André Gaudreault and I borrowed a phrase from 
literary cri tic Hans Robert Jauss and promoted "Early Cinema as a Chal­
lenge to Film History." 1 lntroducing the term "the cinema of attractions," 
we theorized that the spectator, the area of preoccupation of much of film 
theory in the seventies and eighties, needed to be rethought historically, 
with the acknowledgment that different regimes of spectatorship could 
be isolated within cinema history, with the attractions directly addressing 
the viewer in early cinema providing perhaps the most cogent case of a 
spectatorship different from the one addressed by so-called Classical 
cinema. In man y ways, in the last decades of film study, historical research 
projects have dislodged some of the grand claims and the preeminence 
of film theory in our field. But perhaps the central issue we hoped to raise 
was not whether the focus of our field should move from theory to his­
tory, but whether history and theory could inform each other; and this 
remains an under-explored issue. One of the most brilliant advocates 
and practitioners of film history and theory, David Bordwell, has pro­
nounced historical research of limited value in determining the nature of 
film spectatorship, which he maintains cou Id be better understood using 
a non-historical method based in a description of cognitive constants that 
witness little change over millennia. 2 On the other hand, using similar
assumptions about the centraJity of human cognition to the understanding 
of film spectatorship, Ben Singer's recent work has questioned whether 
such tasks as following a narrative or responding to film images may not 
-
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be greatly influenced by historical contexts. 3 Whatever method is pur­
sued, I believe that the historical investigation of film spectatorship, while 
avoiding excessive claims of major differences, will certainly proceed 
fruitfully. 
But the Grand Theory of the Seventies, exemplified particularly by the 
work of Jean-Louis Baudry and the late work of Christian Metz, 4 func­
tioned less as a theory of the spectator than as a theory of the cinematic 
apparatus, a concept both technological and institutional, in which the 
spectator found a predetermined place. If we want to continue the chal­
lenge film history poses to film theory, we must not only research the 
film spectator, but the actual cinematic apparatus, and interrogate the 
meaning and implications of its history. The technical history of the 
cinema has always found a number of obsessive collectors, bricoleurs
and generally fine scholars who have preserved and investigated the appa­
ratuses and practices of cinema and its related realms of optical demon­
stration and entertainment. I would like to note the important recent schol­
arly work of Laurent Mannoni in providing a synoptic view of the Grand 
Art of Light and Shadow, as well as the investigations of Deac Rossel 1, 
David Robinson and Carlo Alberto Zotti Min ici, and the recent convert 
from new media to old, Erkki Huhtamo. 5 But the material presented by 
these scholars and their predecessors has not yet inspired corresponding 
new theoretical approaches to the issue of the cinematic apparatus. 
This may partly be because, for ail the originality and sophistication 
of these new works, the y still conceive of their research in terms of a stor-y 
whose ending we already know: the invention of the cinema. Wh ile Man­
noni brilliantly recreates the magic lantern culture that preceded the rise 
of the cinema and Rossell intriguingly speculates on different paths the 
cinematic apparatus might have taken, the predetermined goal and already 
known climax remains fixed. I do not intend to criticize these works, 
which I find peerless, but rather offer a proposai to further develop their 
findings along a theoretical axis. Once we break with the teleology of 
the archeology and origins of the cinema, our field might expand in a 
dramatic manner, as it will not only enrich our understanding of broader 
cultural history but, paradoxically, will also generate new ways of thinking 
about cinema specifically. Aspects of this expansion are already antici­
pated by the recent exhibition at the Getty Museum of Art curated by Bar­
bara Stafford and Francis Terpak, "Devices of Wonder," which avoids 
industrial or ideological teleology in order to open into a broad celebra­
tion of the devices of visual entertainment. 6 
The expansive energy of this visual culture is not a new discovery, and 
has already enriched previous studies without changing their perspec­
tive. Reading Mannoni's work, I think, one can only be disheartened by 
the narrowing of focus that the story of the emergence of the cinema 
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entails. From a vast se1ies of visual devices, and a vibrant range of pro­
jection practices, cinema emerged almost through a process of elimjna­
tion rather than efflorescence. If instead of moving relentlessly toward 
the défilé of the cinema, we think more broadly about optical devices and 
the wonder they aspire to create, we do not necessarily need to replace 
previous historical models, but wc can rather supplement them with new 
perspectives that open onto new theoretical possibilities. 
Recent calls for histories of visuality and visual culture have already 
posed ways we could rethink the history of the film apparatus. But if 
I am proposing rethinking the teleology of cinema as the end point of 
optical devices, I do not think we should let the history of cinema simply 
become absorbed into the almost bounclless topic of visual culture. I fear 
losing the very specificity offered by the investigation of cinema's deri­
vation from the broader visual culture. The history of cinema provides 
us with a ce11ter to our investigations, one that allows other orbits and 
intersections, but which should not be simply lost in the night Hegel 
describes in which all cows are black. I believe we can follow very spe­
cific pathways of both detailed historical research and theoretical specu­
lation, diverging from and returning to our center in film history, thereby 
avoiding dissolution into a topos without definition. 
r propose we speak of cinema not simply within visual culture, but 
within the more specifïc domain of optics, by which I mean an investi­
gation of speci fic optical devices and the discourses that surround them, 
although our method would involve a phenomenological description of 
optical experiences rather than the mathematical calculations of tradi­
tional optics. As a somewhat humble sketch of the way these issues could 
be raised both historically and theoretically, l offer a brief consideration 
of one device and it implications, the Phantasmagoria, less in terms of 
its detailed history (which Mannoni has presented quite elegantly) than 
in terms of the speculation and metaphors it has generated not only within 
film history but within the broader domain I would call cultural optics. 
The Phantasmagoria, to briefly recap Mannoni's account, 7 appeared 
as a form of elaborate magic lantern entertainment at the end of the eigh­
teenth century. lt exploitecl associations between projected images and 
specters of the dead - linkages that seem to have existed since the origin 
of lantern projections (and which draw on even older associations with 
shadows generally). The Phantasmagoria however, especially in its most 
complex and widely seen form presented by Robertson in Paris in the 
1790s, added or elaborated a number of other aspects. First, the projec­
tions were marked by their combination of site (an abandoned monastery), 
context (the spectator entered the projection room through a darkened 
hall decked out with mysterious symbols and decorations), and a variety 
of sensual effects (especially music and sound, including the otherworldly 
/ 
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tones of the glass harmonica and the rumble of thunder, as well as the 
lecturer's spiel) which were orchestrated with the visual effects. Ali 
these highly theatrical effects were specifically designed to create a sus­
penseful expectation of the unusual and an atmosphere of the uncanny 
for the spectator. 
Secondly, and especially important for its novelty of effect, the actual 
devices of the lantern were concealed, and the show was presented through 
what today we would call back projection, the projectors mounted behind 
the screens. Thus in contrast to most earlier Iantern shows, in which the 
lantern itself was the focus of some attention and even wonder, the lanterns 
of the Phantasmagoria were hidden from view, evident only in their 
effects. Thirdly, the projections were given effects of movement, not only 
through trick slides that performed transformations, but through nove! 
projection devices, such as the moving forward or backward of the 
lanterns from the screen. This could give the effect (since the lantern's 
actual movement was concealed) of either enlarging (or shrinking) the 
image, or of its sudden movement towards (or away from) the viewer. 
These novelties of movement and transformation were especially iden­
tified with the Phantasmagoria. In addition, wavering projections on
smoke created strange unsteady images. The increased spectral nature 
of the projections, and the atmosphere of visual uncertainty createcl a 
sense, as one announcement put it, that the specters appeared on the air 
itself, immaterially. 8 Finally, as I have discussed elsewhere, 9 the Phan­
tasmagoria was deliberately presented in the zone of tension between 
credulity (certain audience members who actually believed the show they 
witnessed contained actual revenants), and the announced demystitïca­
tion of the show by the lecturer as an optical novelty full y explainable 
in terms of scientific principles - in other words as an avowed illusion. 
The combined effect of what we could cal! the concealment of the 
devices and the total immersion of the spectator typify the aspects of 
the Phantasmagoria which Theodore Adorno would understand as a 
major impulse of 19th century art, the triumph of illusion through, the 
"effacing of the traces of their production," the reinforcement "of the 
being-in-itself of art works through technological means." 10 Indeed the 
total immersion techniques of the Phantasmagoria including its use of 
sound and light (and darkness) anticipate the Gesamtkunstwerk of 
Wagner's Bayreuth. In many ways the Phantasmagoria operates precisely 
like Jean Louis Baudry's analysis of the cinematic apparatus. The spec­
tator is positioned, the illusion 's mechanism is concealed, and the effect 
of total sensual illusion may be claimed to be absolute. 
But I would claim we need to explore this experience more histori­
cally and more dialectically. Let me focus on the effect of enlarge­
ment/motion created by the mobile projectors, which for contemporary 
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viewers constituted perhaps the most frequently commented on novelty 
of the show. The impression of rapid motion through enlargement cre­
ated a powerful sensation, but a contradictory one. While Stephen Bot­
tomore is undoubtedly right that part of its immediate power came from 
triggering what perceptual psychologists call the "looming response," an 
instantaneous defensive reaction when a large object suddenly enters our 
perceptual field, a response shared by animais and humans, I would also 
stress that viewers in the cinema and the Phantasmagoria soon realize 
through simple reality testing that no predator or object is actually about 
to threaten them. 11 Thus the looming response may be triggered, but play­
fully, with a response generally of amusement at the false alarm triggered 
by a mistaken perception. The image does not truly approach the viewer, 
yet it appears to do so. Seated in a darkened hal1 with spatial orientation 
undermined, the sudden enlargement of the images produces an im­
mediate effect of confrontation, even of invasion of persona! space. Yet 
the distance between the viewer and the screen on which the image is 
projected does not change. Thus a contradictory kinesthetic and emo­
tional effect is produced by marshaling certain eues of motion, but a rapid 
reality test reveals there is no actual danger and allows the viewer to real­
ize that what appeared to be motion was, after aU, only a trick. 
With this illusion of motion, the Phantasmagoria introduces, I would 
maintain, a basic visual effect which will be constantly repeated in early 
cinema: the sensation of direct confrontation, a contradictory sense of 
emergencc from the screen toward the viewer that is evoked and then dis­
avowed. This looming effect proliferates through early cinema with effects 
ranging from the overtly catastrophic ( How it Feels to Be Run Over), to 
the sensation of rapid approach (the movement of the camera/rocket 
toward the moon face in Méliès Trip to the Moon), to the more implicit 
confrontations of the pistol shot aimed at the camera/ viewer of the outlaw 
Barnes in the emblematic shot of The Great Train Robbery, or the charging 
locomotives of numerous films of trains aimed obliquely at the camera 
in the famous films of the 1890s produced by the Lumière, Edison and 
Biograph companies. 
I have claimed that this sort of direct address characterized the cinema 
of attractions and addressed a rather different spectator from that imag­
ined by classical film narrative. 12 Likewise in focusing on the apparatus 
itself, I would also claim the "illusion" or perhaps better, the sensation, 
of the Phantasmagoria performed something more complex than either 
the simple effacing of the labor of illusion or the ideological positioning 
of a docile spectator. Rather, reflecting the ideological and historical con­
tradiction of the subject matter of the Phantasmagoria (ghosts haunting 
the Age ofReason, staged within a dethroned Church), this illusion drew 
its full effect from the contradiction between cueing certain physical sen-
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sations of motion and emotional reactions, while also revealing their
unreal nature. A divided and vertiginous spectator, physically and emo­
tionally affected but rationally aware of the unreality of these sensations,
appears in this breach. 
ln other words, I am claiming that rather than delivering a mimesis of 
a familiar experience, a simulacrum that interpellates and positions a 
unified spectator in a predictable and seemingly coherent scenario, the 
Phantasmagoria created, through technology, a new experience of motion 
whose very contradictory novelty attracted and fascinated the viewer and 
whose very uncanny nature could then serve as a signifier for an impos­
sible perception (that of ghostly beings). To emphasize the manner in 
which this illusion of disembodied motion could be profoundly disori­
entating I want to cite some fascinating testimony uncovered by Stephen 
Bottomore. An account ofwitnessing the new Manchester railway in 1830 
strives to describe the new perceptual effects of unaccustomed speed and 
motion in terms of cultural optics: 
Tn the rapid motion of these engines, there is an optical deception worth 
noticing. A spectator observing their approach, when at extreme speed, can 
scarcely divest himself of the idea that they are not enlarging and increasing 
in size rather than moving. I know not how to explain my meaning better, 
than by referring to the enlargement of objects in a Phantasmagoria. At first 
the image is barely discernible, but as it advances from the focal point, it seems 
to increase beyond ail limit. Thus an engine, as it draws near, appears to 
become rapidly magnified, as if it would fill up the entire space belween Lhe 
banks, and absorb everything within its vortex. 13 
A number of early film historians, including myself, have claimed that 
the devices of early cinema might be approached as responses to new 
sensory demands of a modern environment, providing a context in which 
speed and immediate transitions, the shocks of modernity such as railway 
travel, might be mediated and represented by the direct confrontations 
characterizing many cinematic attractions 14 - such as the onrushing trains 
and motorcars or pistols shot at close range mentioned earlier. ln this eye­
witness account we seem to encounter, as Bottomore observed in a slightly 
different manner, a reversai: a new sensory experience, the unaccustomed 
speed of an onrushing locomotive, could be initially processed in terms 
of the uncanny visual effect of the Phantasmagoria. The intensity of this 
new experience of mechanized speed and the disorientation it sowed in 
its wake should not be underestimated. The shocks of modernity were 
not simply metaphorical, as demonstrated by a tragic event in 1830 that 
occurred during the opening of the railway into Manchester, which was 
marked by an elaborate ceremony with the Duke of Wellington in atten­
dance. The train stopped en route to Manchester to take on water, and 
one of Britain's leading financiers, a Mr. Huskinsson, crossed over the 
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tracks to greet the Duke. But when the famous locomotive, the Rocket, 
came bearing down upon him, Huskinsson became disoriented as he tried 
to cross the tracks. Rather than getting out of the way he remained "like 
a man bewildered, ... alarmed and agitated" in the path of the speeding 
locomotive and became the first railway fatality, as one commentator put 
it, a sort of propitiatory sacrifice to the new technology. 15 
Thus the Phantasmagoria and later visual and optical devices such as 
the cinema could stand not only as models but even as premonitions of 
unheralded modern visual experiences. From the fact that these percep­
tual novelties were not only unfamiliar but potentially deadly, we can 
see that the fascination offered by the uncanny optics may stand at 
antipodes to the centering and reassuring individualizing interpellation 
that apparatus theorists claimed to form the basis of the power of cinema. 
While I do not want to substitute one totalizing mode! for another, and 
therefore would not deny that the cinema may in some circumstances play 
this sort of ideological role, or that it can in fact serve a disciplining 
function within modernity, nonetheless it seems to me such ideological 
reassurance can not be declared to be inherent in the apparatus itself. 
A historical investigation of the apparatuses of the cinema provides at 
least a counter-history to the ahistorical idealist myth of a complicit ap­
paratus manufacturing complicit spectators and citizens, as proposed by 
seventies film theory. 
2. The Uses of Illusion
Any sophisticated reader of seventies film theory recognized that the
critique of cinematic vision o ffered by apparatus theory was rooted in a 
broader late twentieth century critique of the ocularcentrism and the he­
gemony of vision, articulated in a variety of ways from Heidegger and 
Sartre to Foucault and Debord (or if such recognition was not immediate, 
Martin Jay's maste1ful explication ofthis modern suspicion of the visual 
in Downcast Eyes could suppl y it). 16 But, as Jay reminds us, a particular 
reified sort of vision, the rationalized, aggressive, knowledge-and-mas­
tery-seeking vision associated with Western metaphysics formecl the target 
of this critique. Recent work by theorists such as Jonathan Crary have 
focused new attention on the history rather than the theory of vision, on 
the transformations which took place within both theories and practices 
of vision. Crary has describecl the appearance of the conception of an 
embodied sight in the nineteenth century, which displaced the disem­
bodied panoptic eye of earlier metaphysics. 17 While Crary clearly out­
lines the disciplinary rote this new understanding of vision could usher 
in, I would claim that in investigating this embodied vision, the cinema, 
as representative of a long tradition of popular visual devices, may offer 
38 
TOM GUNNING 
practices of vision other than disciplinary ones, rather than simply being 
identified with the bad object of dominant visual objectifïcation and what 
Martin Heidegger has called "the age of the world picture." 18 Wh ile it is
much tao simple to merely invert the terms of the denigration of vision 
(and risk losing the important critical insights these critics have made) 
nonetheless, a dialectical mode] seems to be in order. 
While apparatus theory proclaimed an attack on the "realism" of the 
cinematic image, and called for a radical undermining of the metaphysics 
of identity and coherence, it frequently described these targets as illu­
sion or deceptions, as if a hidden card of apodictic truth remained up 
someone's sleeve. Traditionally the science of optics has a strong asso­
ciation with the Enlightenment, one of whose major tropes consists 
in the dispelling of illusion. While proclaiming materialist inspiration, 
Baudry more or Jess directly announced his ambitions to deliver us from 
our absorption in the shadows passing on the wall of Plato's subterranean 
screening room, leading us out of the realm of shadows into the efful­
gence of the truth. 19 Baudry and apparatus theory thus embraced the foun­
dational myth of Western Idealism and identified the cinematic apparatus 
with the shadowy illusions of Plato's cave. Rather than overturning or 
even questioning the dichotomy between perception and reality that 
broods over Western metaphysics, the ideological critique of the appa­
ratus claimed the heritage of dispelling illusion and liberation from 
enthrallment, which this myth made foundational. In this it allied itself 
with the Enlightenment aspect of much of Marxist thought which also 
posed optical devices, whether the camera obscura or the Phantasmagoria, 
as emblems of the misrecognition of reality through the acceptance of a 
manipulated ilJusion for the real state of things. 
Let me deepen the historical context of this argument by introducing 
the cultural optics of which I spoke earlier. Cinema, understood as part 
of the centuries old "great art of light and shadow," displays a truly dialec­
tical and perhaps even contradictory relation to the project of Enlight­
enment. As an optical device, cinema and its visual ancestors derive from 
the new science of optics that fascinated Descartes and other Enlighten­
ment figures, including Christian Huygens, the most likely inventor of the 
magic lantern. However, as Barbara Stafford has shown in her study of 
eighteenth century visual devices, Artful Science, such devices were de­
signed for two rather contrary, yet dialectically related, purposes. The first 
was scientific and enlightening. By demonstrating the visual logic behind 
an optical illusion the savant or philosophe cou Id make scienti fic demons­
tration triumphant, dissolving a wondrous illusion into its generative and 
explicable logic. However, in the hands of a mountebank, these illusions 
might create nothing but wonder, or, worse yet, might engender super­
stitious beliefs, especially when presented before a gullible audience. 20 
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To a nineteenth century audience, cinema appeared within a tradition 
of visual magic that had become part of popular entertainment at least 
since the Enlightenment, reaching a technological climax at the end of 
the nineteenth century. 21 Rarely claiming supernatural powers (except, 
of course, in the fascinating and ambiguous case of the Spiritualist per­
formers, such as the Davenport brothers) nineteenth century magicians 
more frequently operated within a realm of demystification. Frequently 
parodying and mocking their Spiritualist counterparts, such magicians 
claimed no extra-human aid, yet fervently concealed the secrets behind 
their illusions. They provoked curiosity and astonishment by producing 
illusions that entertained by denying supernatural revelation or miracles, 
but also by avoiding a full y explicated demonstration of their mysterious 
processes. The pleasure such illusions offered lay in making the audi­
ence attend to their own sensuous experience, and asking them to doubt 
their very eyes, even as they experienced an uncanny sort of seeing. 
But this offer of pure illusion as a form of entertainment sharply con­
trasts with the use of visual illusion within discourses of authority. For 
in investigating the use of tricks and visual illusions, we find that tricks 
are almost always inducted into an ideological context, of either demys­
tification or allegory. The de-mystifying critique of ideology sought to 
reveal the trick or illusion as nothing other than illusion - as not revealing 
any supernatural powers. Thus the true target of suspicion would seem 
to be not the puzzle that the trick occasioned, but its possible deception 
of a viewer about true cause and effect. Magic tricks operated like com­
modity capitalism though an occluding of labor, concealing the actual 
effective gesture and seeming to produce things "by magic." A trick 
acknowledged as a trick might cause no deception and appear as harm­
less and entertaining as the Chinese conjurer in Vertov's The Man with
the Movie Camera when it is fully explained and its surplus value of 
wonder liquidated. Tricks that undo themselves are thus essential to an 
enlightenment system that seeks to separate visual illusion from scien­
tific certainty. 
The enlightenment interest in "philosophical toys" included visual 
devices that demonstrated illusions and the manner in which they were 
produced (including the various motion devices such as the thaumatrope 
or phenakistoscope to which the origins of the cinema are frequently 
traced). These were designed, as Barbara Stafford has shown, primarily 
for the education of the elite young. 22 Science, white rendered enter­
taining, nonetheless carried the essential tesson that these illusions were 
explainable. Thus they also inoculated the young against the spectacles 
of superstition that the philosophes associated especially with the 
Catholic Church. But, in fact, optical devices had also been used by the 
Jesuits during the Counter Reformation as visual allegories, not simply 
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to convince the ignorant of the powers of God and his Church, but to reveal 
to the learned as well the conditional nature of knowledge and percep­
tion in the fallen world of creation. Thus an anamorphic landscape 
painting, which could appear either as a craggy mountain or as the face 
of an old man, bore the caption "Your attempts to view me are vain/[f 
you perceive me, you will not see me anymore."23 Similarly, the extraor­
dinary devices and illusions manufactured by Jesuit theologian Athana­
sius Kircher through "Natural Magic" served less to demonstrate scien­
tific principles than to reveal the wondrous and mysterious nature of God 's 
creation. 24 Such visual demonstrations and illusions called perception and 
knowledge into question. Thus, both rational demystifying demonstra­
tion and religiously mystic enigmas used optical illusions as means to 
cause the viewer to reflect on the limited and fragile nature of human 
perception, rather than to deceive. Science or Faith cou Id, however, dispel 
these uncertainties. 
We could therefore specify three different receptions, practices and 
understandings surrounding visual illusions in the post-Enlightenment 
era. The first, pedagogical and enlightened, would explain, for instance, 
the superimposed images of a Thaumatrope as illustrating the physio­
logical optics of the eye. The confusion of the images does not exist in 
reality, but is merely the product of persistence of vision. Thus the illu­
sion itself is dissolved in favor of its explanatory function about the nature 
of perception. On the other hand, within a tradition dedicated to Faith 
and Authority, visual illusion could demonstratc not so much the 
working of perception as their inherent fallibility, the untrustworthy nature 
ofhuman senses and consciousness in need of a transcendent faith to make 
sense of the world. But our third option, that of the magician-illusionist, 
invokes neither faith nor science, but entertainment. The magician would 
announce that the illusion was not dependent on supernatural forces, and 
cou Id be explained in terms of natural forces. However, unlike the Enlight­
enment pedagogue, the magician withholds the explanation, and clelivers 
no debunking demonstration. Instead, he or she leaves the spectator sus­
pended in their uncertainty, doubting what they have just seen yet unable 
to cleny or thoroughly explain it. In this suspense dwells the entertaining 
pleasure of uncertainty and ambiguity. 
Optical illusions forma complex figure, whose power may not lie pri­
marily in the ability to fool someone into taking them for "reality." Rather 
they confound habituai attitudes towards perception, indeed sowing 
doubts about the nature of reality. These doubts cou Id play a pedagogic 
role in either rational systems (perception is not to be trusted, but must 
be buttressed by knowledge of scientific causes and the demonstration 
which the scientific method calls for) or transcendent systems of belief 
(mere perception is fallible; only faith in transcenclence can make sense 
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of creation). But short of their appropriation by larger pedagogical 
systems, such illusions primarily spawn wonder, astonishment and 
curiosity. Rather than buttressing the power of vision, they may call it 
into question, the essential claim of the conjurer being chat "the hand is 
quicker than the eye." Thus the magician, at least since the age ofEnlight­
enment, avoids claims of supernatural power, but also refuses to reveal 
the basis of his trick. The magician 's vow (admittedly often violated, but 
what vows are not ?) to never reveal the trick does more than preserve a 
gui Id or a professional secret. lt maintains an attitude of uncertainty and 
wonder on the part of the spectator who must always wrestle with what 
she saw and what she thinks she saw, with both the uncertainty and the 
power of perception. 
Thus, the danger presented by visual illusion may not lie in its claims 
to spurious systems of cause and effects such as the ability to make the 
dead manifest. 1 would claim instead that apparatus theory, as a new form 
of Puritanism, essentially set itself against the visual pleasure and play­
fulness offered by the cinemalic illusion, placing itself within a long 
tradition of Western metaphysics which distrusts appearances and uncer­
tainty. While we have seen that trickery can be rendered inoffensive, even 
pedagogical, this taming of illusion depends on either a demystifying 
rational explanation of tricks, or an allegorization of them as indicative 
of the need for transcendent authority. But if the trick served neither as 
demystifying demonstration nor as allegory, as buttress neither to the 
explanations of science nor the mysteries of the Faüh, then trick and visual 
illusion might maintain a dangerous anarchie force, a questioning of 
authority itself in favor of the pure play of sensation. 
Curiously, within a traditional cultural optics the conjurer and the jug­
gler compose a single figure, both equally condemned as untrustworthy 
and potentially evil. Before the nineteenth century, legal, religious and 
even philosophie institutions condemned the juggler as passionately as 
the conjurer; sleight of hand generated as much anxiety as (false ?) claims 
of supernatural power. As Stafford points out, manual facility even in the 
arts was often viewed with suspicion, often seen as a tool of deception. 25 
l think that within the suspicion of the cinematic apparatus we find a sim­
ilar anxiety about the nature of an art of vision that is also, as a mechani­
cal art, quicker than the eye, able to make us see things we know aren't
there. Lin king the cinema with the juggler, we might linger over one ven­
erable trick which predates, but 1 think anticipates, the Phantasmagoria:
the combination of manual dexterity and visual illusion which master
magician and historian Ricky Jay terms "blow books," but which I prefer,
for reasons that will be obvious, to call by another of their traditional
names, "flick books." 26 Flick books employed notched pages and care­
fully arranged visual illustrations which a mountebank could manipu-
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late to make images seem to appear, disappear or undergo transforma­
tions magically. Reginald Scott's sixteenth century The Discoverie of 
Witchcraft described flick books this way: "Ye hab they saie a booke, 
wherof he would make you think first that every leafe was clean 
white paper: then by virtue of words he would shew your everie leaf to 
be painted with birds, then with beasts, then with serpents, then with 
angels etc." 
Scott found it nearly impossible to describe this book - its manipula­
tion and effects - in words, saying, "Best because you will hardlie con­
ceive hereof by this description, you shall (if you be disposed) see or buie 
for a small value the like booke," giving an address of a book shop where 
it could be purchased "for your further instruction." 27 
The term "fück book" prolepticaJly evokes early cinema, the "flickers" 
or, in contemporary vernacular, "flicks." The derivation of the term bifur­
cates in an interesting manner. Our conjurer's flick book refers to the 
deft and rapid movement of the hand, the "tlick of a wrist." The cinema 
gained its name through an analogously rapid motion of light, originally 
describing the behavior of flames or mirror retlections "flickering." The 
term thus unîtes the two aspects of optical trickery, the manual skill of 
juggling and the rapidity of Iight itself, accenting light's ability not only 
to reveal, illuminate and enlighten, but to conceal, cast shadows, create 
illusions. The history of early cinema's imbrication with stage magic is 
well known; stage magicians like Felicien Trewey, John Stuart Blackton 
or Georges Méliès adopted the cinema as the latest conjuring device, one 
more nineteenth century example of the precision machine replacing the 
skilled hand. 
Much of Western metaphysics derives from retlection upon the fal­
libility of the senses or human perception. Descartes' meditations insti­
tute a process of systematic doubt which leads to the apparently apod­
ictic truth of the fact of consciousness, beginning in the First Meditation 
on First Philosophy by imagining a conjurer of cosmic proportions, the 
evil demon who can create a world of endless deception. The ultimatc 
lesson of Descartes' imagined trip to a cosmic magic show is not only
to doubt the evidence of the senses, but to found the assurance of knowl­
edge more deeply in both the fact of consciousness and the existence of
� God whose goodness guarantees the impossibility of a cosmos of decep­
tton. Descartes' philosophical sieight of hand consists in invoking the
divine reassurance of consciousness after demonstrating the possibility
of deception via the senses. Consciousness which leads to knowledge for
Descartes takes a different road than perception. Thus Descartes provides,
like the Enlightenment pedagogues or the Jesuit theologians, the assur­
ance of explairung away the trick which the mountebank refuses to offer. 2x
The fascination of the trick itself, its contradictory rather than self-
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founding nature, opens a delight in, perhaps even an unprincipled pas­
sion for, an illusion whose very nature would seem to undermine the meta­
physics of reassuring certainty. 
Thus the power of cinema (or one of them; why must its power be 
single?) may lie precisely in its lack of certainty, the confusion it sows, 
ils maintenance of a realm of playful rather than total illusion, an uncanny 
questioning of perception (did I really see that ?) rather than religious 
revelation or scientific certainty. While a historical investigation of the 
cinematic apparatus and its relation to a cultural optics must not seek an 
essential determining nature of the apparatus, we can see in cinema's 
genealogy, its early history, its recurring devices and (if we wanted to 
extend this discussion beyond the period of early cinema) in its genres 
and special effects, a recurring if not always dominant fascination with 
the visually uncertain and uncanny, with flickering illusion. 
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